Global Regime on Tobacco Control?: The Role of Transnational Advocacy Networks

Amit Mukherjee
Stockton University

Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) has 180 parties representing 89% of the world population. Tobacco industry fought hard in opposition to the treaty, preferring instead industry self-regulation under free trade ethos. After establishing the FCTC regime, now there is a thrust to implement its provisions, monitor implementation and stigmatize non-implementation. If the tobacco industry is losing its battle to prevent FCTC from being such a threat, who is winning and how? Transnational Advocacy Network’s efforts is winning by being able to convince the regime-makers as to the importance of the FCTC by successfully circulating, its knowledge, expertise and ideas.

INTRODUCTION

International business environment is shaped nowadays by a diversity of actors as transnational corporations interact in the political arena with international governmental and non-governmental organizations, politicians, bureaucrats and pressure groups. “Because companies create and distribute value, a plethora of actors seek to influence them-formally, through laws and regulation, and informally, through social pressure, activism and efforts to shape the public perception of business.” (Bach and Allen, 2010, p.42) Therefore, one of the key determinants of success for large transnational corporations is adroit navigation of the non-market business environment and astute engagement in business diplomacy. (Muldoon, J.P.J., 2005 and Saner, R; Yiu, L. & Sondergaard, M, 2000.)

This paper studies the significant setback of a powerful group of transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) in the disputed policy area of tobacco control. In seeking to understand the politics, polemics and process by which opponents of the TTCs are able to establish, sustain, even expand the global anti-tobacco regime, we employ the conceptual tool of Transnational Advocacy Networks (TAN).

THE GLOBAL REGIME ON TOBACCO CONTROL

The foundation of the global regime on tobacco control is the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Adopted by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2003, FCTC entered into force in 2005 and by January, 2017, has 180 parties to the Treaty representing 89% of the world population. The Foreword to the treaty declares:

The WHO FCTC was developed in response to the globalization of the tobacco epidemic. The spread of the tobacco epidemic is facilitated through a variety of complex factors with cross-border effects, including trade liberalization and direct foreign investment. Other factors
such as global marketing, transnational tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship, and the international movement of contraband and counterfeit cigarettes have also contributed to the explosive increase in tobacco use. (WHO, 2003, p. v)

The FCTC contains both demand reduction and supply reduction provisions. Key obligations in the treaty are to:

- enact comprehensive bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship
- increase tobacco taxes
- adopt and implement large, clear, visible, legible and rotating health warnings on tobacco products and their packaging
- protect people from exposure to tobacco smoke from indoor work and public places
- ban the use of terms such as ‘light’ and ‘mild’
- implement measures to combat smuggling of tobacco products.

The treaty also contains numerous other measures designed to promote and protect public health, such as mandating the disclosure of ingredients in tobacco products, providing treatment for tobacco addiction, encouraging legal action against the tobacco industry, and promoting research and the exchange of information among countries. In 2008, WHO introduced a package of six evidence-based tobacco control demand reduction measures, known as the MPOWER to assist countries to fulfil their WHO FCTC obligations. MPOWER refers to M: Monitoring tobacco use and prevention policies; P: Protecting people from tobacco smoke; O: Offering help to quit tobacco use; W: Warning about the dangers of tobacco; E: Enforcing bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship, and R: Raising taxes on tobacco. (WHO, 2008)

The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the governing body of the Convention that typically meets every other year to review implementation of the Convention and takes the decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation. The 7th Conference of Parties was held in New Delhi, India in November, 2016. The Convention Secretariat was established by the COP and is hosted by WHO in Geneva. The main functions of the Secretariat are supporting Parties in fulfilling their obligations under the Convention, providing the necessary support to the COP and translating the decisions of the COP into program activities.

MAJOR SETBACK FOR THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY

FCTC is a major blow to the global expansion strategies and marketing practices of TTCs. At the strategic level, demographic segmentation by age, targeting children (new customers are overwhelmingly children in most societies) and positioning tobacco products so as to appeal to this segment are banned. At the tactical level of marketing, there are rigid controls on the contents of the product, pricing to end consumers, as well as packaging, promotional and distributional elements. Note that many of the restrictions on tobacco marketing contained in the treaty were already part of domestic regulations in the developed countries in North America and Western Europe. The main thrust of the treaty was to introduce these ‘best practices’ regulations to the burgeoning markets in the developing world with its significantly less restrictions on tobacco marketing. Consequently, the treaty was perceived as a major obstruction to TTC expansion in the poorer countries in the developing world. (Mukherjee & Ekanayake, 2009)

As is to be expected, the industry vehemently opposed the treaty, lobbying instead for voluntary agreements and regulation by the market. In fact, since the 1970s the otherwise hyper-competitive tobacco industry has put aside its competitive interests to sponsor pro-tobacco industry interest groups like the International Committee on Smoking Issues (ICOSI) and the International Tobacco Information Center (INFOTAB). These institutions attempted to shape public opinion about tobacco through public relations and media campaigns, disseminated pro-tobacco ‘scientific’ research findings and monitored worldwide policy developments in tobacco control (Farquharson, 2003). However, in spite of bitter and persistent opposition by the tobacco industry, the FCTC was adopted by WHO with a strong push at implementation of the various provisions, most recently at the Seventh Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-7) to the WHO FCTC in 2016. This paper, then, explores the following questions: if the
tobacco industry is losing its battle to prevent the global regime on tobacco control from harming its interests, who is winning and how? What lessons are to be gleaned from this for the multiple interests involved?

The relationship among business, government and society is complex, with both business and civil society attempting to influence public policy. In our study, business and civil society has been wrestling in the WHO arena over FCTC. While reviewing the role of the civil society in the FCTC regime, we go beyond an investigation of the role of NGOs to attempting to uncover the mechanics of their success in representing the civil society at FCTC deliberations. In our effort to understand the role of community, aggregation of interests and viewpoints, structured interaction and policy expertise in the establishment of the FCTC regime, we use the conceptual tool of ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks’ (TAN) discussed in the next section. Our research suggests that TOTAN (our term in this article for TANs working on TObacco control) efforts is winning the battle by being able to persuade multiple non-market stakeholders as to the needs of the FCTC by relying on, and successfully circulating, its knowledge, expertise and ideas.

TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS (TAN)

Recent scholarship on civil society activism has paid great attention to TANs within the context of a globalizing world where borders between states become permeable to cross-border political influence. Research on TANs is relatively new, the agenda being systematic examination of how transnational networks of advocates cooperate to bring about policy change. Keck and Sikkink sparked the debate about TAN’s role in their seminal work, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). According to them, “a transnational advocacy network includes those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” and “often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to their interests” (Keck & Sikkink, 1999, p. 89). TANs emerge on complex issue areas characterized by information uncertainty leading to an array of options with ambiguous outcomes. TANs not only try to influence policy, they also try to shape the policy setting by framing the ways their issues are discussed; by seeking friendly venues and by deploying information quickly, accurately and effectively. The approach emphasizes the shared beliefs held by coalition members that are ideologically based and attempt to tie the group together. (Farquharson, 2003) These political entrepreneurs show a sophisticated understanding of the political opportunity structures within which they operate and “mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories, and to persuade, pressurize, and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments.” (Keck & Sikkink, 1999 p. 89) TANs are not necessarily about mass mobilization at the grassroots level, though they do make resources available to emerging actors in the developing world engaged in political and social struggles. Indeed, the kind of pressure and agenda politics in which they engage often involve a small number of activists in a given campaign or advocacy role.

The tactics that TANs use include:

(a) *Information politics*, or the ability to move politically usable information quickly and credibly to where it will have the most impact; (b) *symbolic politics*, or the ability to call upon symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation or claim for an audience that is frequently far away; (c) *leverage politics*, or the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence; and (d) *accountability politics*, or the effort to oblige more powerful actors to act on vaguer policies or principles they formally endorsed. (Keck & Sikkink, 1999, p. 95)
TOBACCO INDUSTRY OPPOSITION TO THE GLOBAL ANTI-TOBACCO REGIME

TTCs have progressively extended their reach around the globe. In 2014, British American Tobacco (BAT) sold 667 billion cigarettes worldwide made in 44 factories in 41 countries. 28% of sales came from the East Europe, Middle East and Africa region, followed by Asia-Pacific (27%), Western Europe (23%) and the Americas (22%). In the same year, Philip Morris International (PMI) shipped 856 billion cigarettes to 180 markets worldwide made in 50 factories in 30 countries. 34.2% of sales came from the East Europe, Middle East and Africa region, followed by EU (30.9%), Asia (26.4%) and Latin America + Canada (8.5%). (BAT-Annual Report 2015 & PMI- Annual Report 2015)

Demand for tobacco products is gradually decreasing in the Americas and in Western Europe because of shifting public outlooks concerning tobacco and more restrictive regulations. Prevalence of cigarette smoking by adult population in the U.S. dropped from 42.4% in 1965 through 20.9% in 2005 to 17.8% in 2013. (CDC, 2014). Most European countries, too, have experienced a steady decline in cigarette smoking. Between 2002 and 2012 decline ranged from almost 50% in Norway to 7% in France. (Connelly, 2015). In contrast, cigarette production and consumption is becoming increasingly concentrated in the developing world. In addition to increased cigarette smoking in booming East Asia, between 1990 and 2009 cigarette consumption in Africa and the Middle East increased by 57%. (ASH Fact Sheet, 2015) Thus, in spite of contraction in their traditional markets in North America and Western Europe, TTCs have recorded increased sales and profits over the years. BAT, for example increased annual revenue by 26% between 2008 and 2013 (BAT Annual Report, 2015), while PMI increased the same by 45% between 2007 and 2014 (PMI Annual Report, 2015). Globalization, then, has the obvious potential to benefit the TTCs by (a) easing access to markets in various corners of the globe through trade liberalization and specific provisions under WTO; (b) improved consumer and trade promotion as well as sponsorship opportunities via global communication web; and (c) greater economies of scale and scope by strategically distributed production facilities, better logistics and supply chain management leading to better access to larger markets, and the expansion of global brands. (Mukherjee & Ekanayake, 2009)

Against this background of global expansion opportunity, the threat of the FCTC regime seem daunting. But for the global alliance against tobacco marketing, the future of TTCs would have been optimistic indeed in the low and middle-income countries with its rising consumer disposable income, trade liberalization and increased exposure both to sophisticated mass promotional campaigns and to the lure of the developed world via social media and broadband internet. TTCs, of course, fervently opposed the treaty, urging instead voluntary codes of conduct, self-regulatory bodies, regular reporting of self-monitoring actions, corporate charity initiatives and regulation by market mechanisms. Industry strategies to systematically undermine tobacco control initiatives at the WHO had been the subject of an inquiry by WHO because “Malaria experts cannot make progress without understanding how the primary vector, the mosquito, functions, behaves, breeds and thrives. For tobacco-control experts, the vectors are tobacco companies.” (Yach, 2001, p.2) This well-publicized inquiry (WHO 2000) found that there had been a conspiracy since the early 1980s to ensure that WHO didn’t establish a strong global tobacco control regime and revealed that the TTCs carried out their plan by:

* staging events to divert attention from the public health issues raised by tobacco use;
* attempting to reduce budgets for the scientific and policy activities carried out by WHO;
* pitting other UN agencies against WHO;

* seeking to convince developing countries that WHO’s tobacco control program was a rich nation agenda carried out at the expense of the poorer nations;
* distorting the findings of WHO studies on the detrimental health effects of tobacco use; and
* discrediting WHO as an institution dedicated to advancing global public health.
The results of this inquiry were very damaging to TTC interests and led to the industry’s eventual expulsion from formal FCTC negotiations as well as all follow-up COP deliberations. (Yach, 2001; FCTC, 2016)

TTC internal corporate documents further revealed that they (1) attempted to persuade the WTO to oppose tobacco control initiatives by WHO; (2) used data from research sponsored by the industry to disparage WHO research into tobacco addiction, adverse health effects of second hand smoke inhalation etc.; (3) funded lobbyists to influence national decision makers to vote against WHO tobacco control initiatives; and (4) meticulously fabricated an image of highbrow Western tobacco-control fanatics apathetic to the developing countries’ economics sufferings under a harsh regime on tobacco control. (Corporate Responsibility Coalition, 2005; Hammond & Rowell, 2001)

TOTAN IN ACTION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ANTI-TOBACCO REGIME

As is clear from the preceding section, the tobacco industry vehemently opposed the FCTC and employed substantial resources in opposing its adoption and later, implementation. And, while incremental measures to decrease tobacco use by national legislation may not seem to be too difficult a problem, a broad international treaty with severe restrictions on the tobacco industry has been a complex problem encountered by the national delegates to the several FCTC negotiating rounds and COP deliberations. The very first multilateral agreement on public health and under WHO sponsorship, there is less apparent rationale for global coordination on tobacco control, in contrast, say, to an agreement on the global environment or on armed conflict. Moreover, many politicians and bureaucrats in developing countries continue to believe that they have much more pressing problems to deal with in public health like AIDS, ebola and zika viruses etc. and question the need for loss of tobacco revenue and costs of implementation measures of FCTC. Against this background, the institutionalization of the FCTC is a major victory for the civil society and an essential learning opportunity for business interests. We demonstrate in this paper that the civil society’s success was due to the leadership role of the TOTAN.

Who are the members of the TOTAN? Too numerous to mention by name, these include, a) international NGOs like the Framework Convention Alliance and the Global Smokefree Partnership; b) domestic NGOs like the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids and ASH, Action on Smoking and Health; c) research and advocacy organizations like the Institute for Global Tobacco Control, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, and Center for Tobacco Control Research, UCSF d) local social movements (churches, consumer organizations, public intellectuals); d) the media; and e) parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations like the WHO, and the European Commission’s Public Health Program.

Tactics employed by the TOTAN include:

a) Information Politics:
To the extent information is power, TOTANs have adroitly used this power play to strengthen the global anti-tobacco regime. The hub of information dissemination activity is the Framework Convention Alliance (FCA) through its website: fctc.org. FCA, established in 2013, is comprised of nearly 500 organizations from over 100 countries and works on the development, ratification and implementation of the FCTC. Funding is provided-among others-by the American Cancer Society, American Heart Association, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Bloomberg Philanthropies. This umbrella organization is also a prominent campaigner for including the FCTC and global tobacco control in the global health and development policy-making framework. Partly as a result of its efforts, in September 2015, the UN General Assembly specifically included strengthening the implementation of the FCTC as part of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations.

The FCA has a formal observer status to COP that entitles them to attend the public sessions of the COP and meetings of its subsidiary bodies. It makes earnest use of this opportunity in providing detailed policy papers, policy briefs and fact sheets to national delegates of the COP as they arrive for the
meetings and provides continuous updates and press briefings as the meetings take place. These extensively researched, well-crafted position papers cover the gamut of issues under the purview of FCTC including industry interference, pricing and taxation, product regulation, packaging and labelling, advertising, promotion, sponsorship and demand reduction measures.

The FCA also acts as an information portal, depository and clearing house for a multitude of organizations interested in various aspects of tobacco control. It supports NGOs, experts and activists world-wide by providing them with advocacy tool kits containing talking points, Swiss cheese press releases and op-ed articles. These materials are especially valuable to NGOs in developing countries that lack adequate financial and information resources.

b) Symbolic Politics:

Tobacco companies continue to spend billions of dollars each year to market their products. In 2014 (the most recent year for which data are available), tobacco companies spent more than $9 billion on advertising and promotional expenses in the United States alone. This amounted to more than $28 for every person (adults and children) and more than $227 for each adult smoker in the U.S. per year. (CDC, 2017). Smoking a cigarette historically has been depicted as symbolic of happy, virile, ‘alpha male’ life (Marlboro man) or of the life of independent, self-assured, successful woman (Virginia Slims with the tagline ‘You’ve come a long way, baby!’). Counteracting this fantasy life is the symbolism of the rotating, graphic pictures depicted on tobacco products mandated by FCTC and the symbolic indignity of being ostracized from social gatherings as smoking is being banned from public spaces as part of anti-smoking measures. A public pleasure with friends and family is being transformed to a lonely, guilt-stricken, anti-social act of self-indulgence by addicts. TOTANs have tirelessly worked to embrace and propagate these visual symbolisms on product packaging as well as sponsoring attention-grabbing anti-tobacco advertisements in broadcast, print and social media.

TOTANs have also used symbolism in spreading the powerful causal story of responsibility and guilt. They depict the TTCs as disease vectors hooking unsuspecting, vulnerable children to lifelong tobacco addiction eventually killing its victims by causing cancers and being significant risk factors in strokes and fatal heart attacks because “tobacco is the only legally available consumer product which kills people when it is used entirely as intended.” (Walton, Barondess & Lock, 1994 p. 908)

c) Leverage Politics:

TOTAN’s goals require signification policy change by their target actors, the TTCs. In order to bring about such drastic policy changes, TOTANs need to persuade, pressurize and gain influence by seeking leverage over vastly more powerful TTCs. We discuss two kinds of leverage employed by the less powerful TOTANs- material leverage and moral leverage.

i) Material leverage:

As relatively weak players, TOTANs have limited ability to change TTC business policy on their own. However, by creating and mobilizing issue-linkage to more powerful international governmental institutions like the WHO, the World Bank and the UN, TOTANs have used material leverage to try and force TTCs to comply with its agenda of tobacco control. A detailed exposition of the tactics employed is beyond the scope of this article, but briefly, TOTANs have made skillful use of the political opportunity structure of WHO to institutionalize and strengthen FCTC, and of the UN in including FCTC in its Sustainable Development Goals. TOTANs have also influenced and been influenced by The World Bank Tobacco Control Program’s extensive work on reducing tobacco affordability and consumption by tobacco tax reform measures. (World Bank, 2016)

ii) Moral Leverage:

This involves taking the moral high ground in the mobilization of shame. TTC insistence on the right of consumer choice and of tobacco farmers, of selling a legal product that is no more harmful than many other food and beverage available in the market are being debunked and held up to the bright light of
international scrutiny. The powerful narrative of tobacco users as substance abusers or nicotine drug addicts invariably depicts the TTCs as immoral disease vectors preying on vulnerable adults and children. Such a depiction also ‘shames’ other powerful actors-national, provincial and local governments, tobacco tax-dependent countries, the media etc.-perhaps with a more nuanced or self-interested view on the issue-to ‘do the right thing’ by siding with the TOTANs.

d) Accountability Politics:
Talk is cheap and so is signing on to highfalutin declarations in support of causes. Indeed, nation-states often make commitments ‘as a matter of principle’ to pay lip service to a worthy cause hoping to deflect criticism and remove them from public and media scrutiny. FCTC, for example, has the clear potential to be such an aspirational, somewhat celebratory document signed on by delegates from 180 countries. TOTANs, however, try to make such signatures into opportunities for accountability politics. First, TOTANs use leverage politics (moral leverage) to encourage nation-states to commit to tobacco control policies in principle. Once that is achieved, committing to FCTC seems to be the logical next step. And, when a government has publicly committed itself to FCTC, TOTANs strive to hold them accountable not only to the broad principles but specific implementation provisions included in the treaty and later emerging from biennial COPs.

In the court of public and media opinion, TTCs have been on the defensive for many years. Although asserting in the main their right to sell legitimate tobacco products, they profess to be trustworthy corporate citizens accepting the ethos of corporate social responsibility. As such, most abide by publicly available Corporate Code of Conduct that invariably delineate high standard of sales and marketing practices including an undertaking not to market to children. TOTANs expertly use these Code of Conduct commitments to expose the distance between commitment and practice. For example, TOTANs use the vocabulary of human rights, particularly children’s rights to a healthy and (therefore) tobacco-free environment to hold TTCs accountable to their professed commitment to social responsibility. This is embarrassing to the TTCs who may be compelled to save face by attempting to close the distance.

HAVE TOTANs BEEN EFFECTIVE? A SUMMARY DISCUSSION

In this section, we summarize TOTAN effectiveness in the light of Keck and Sikkink’s identification of four main types of effectiveness for TANs:

a) Creating agendas and issues:
People around the world are increasingly aware that individuals should reduce or avoid consuming tobacco products because of their adverse health effects. That TTCs deliberately cause such morbid, preventable health disasters and therefore, should be strictly regulated, if not made illegitimate, do not directly follow from that awareness. TOTANs have played a key role in creating this awareness of TTC culpability and making it a key agenda item to be addressed by global public health institutions, governments and the civil society.

b) Influencing positions and procedures of international organizations:
WHO has the constitutional authority to initiate multilateral treaties to advance global public health. However, the idea of a legalistic approach to tobacco control under WHO auspices by means of the FCTC came NOT from WHO officials but from TOTANs. In fact, the idea met with considerable resistance from many WHO officials who favored some form of a “soft law”, non-binding WHO Code of Conduct on the issue. TOTANs worked tirelessly for over a decade to overcome internal WHO objections until the treaty came into force in 2005. (Mamudu, H., 2005). They have now firmly entrenched themselves in the implementation phase of the treaty by actively participating formally in the COP process and informally lobbying through the corridors of WHO institutions.
c) Influencing policy changes in target actors:
From TOTAN perspective, FCTC is the principal means to the end of targeting harmful business practices of the TTCs. TTC sales and marketing practices have indeed changed much in favor of the goals of tobacco control, though it is difficult to attribute these policy changes directly to TOTAN efforts in the absence of access to internal TTC documents. Public comments by high level TTC executives do indeed point to the efficacy of TOTAN actions directly through traditional and social media, the court of public opinion etc. and indirectly by means of the FCTC. (BAT, 2017)

d) Influencing state positions and behavior:
As noted previously, FCTC opened for signature in 2003, entered into force in 2005 (with 40 signatories), and by January, 2017, has 180 parties representing 89% of the world’s population. Throughout these years, TOTANs have diligently worked around the world in getting national governments to commit to the treaty by signature and ratification. After obtaining such formal commitment, TOTANs have motivated states to make changes in domestic law, rules and regulations to conform to the treaty provisions. Finally, TOTANs have acted as watchdogs to the treaty by monitoring compliance and admonishing non-compliance by the state parties.

CONCLUSION

While tobacco products traditionally have been marketed by powerful transnational companies operating in various regions of the globe, tobacco control largely had been a matter of national concern. This very much suited TTC interests as they were able to thwart attempts to implement strict tobacco control policies at the national level. However, the emergence of a strong anti-tobacco TAN with its missionary zeal and broad coalition building capacity put TTCs on the defensive. TOTANs played a key role in elevating tobacco control from a purely domestic issue to a global issue, encouraged WHO to take decisive measures to combat TTCs and to that end facilitated the adoption of the FCTC-the first undertaking in global health governance to regulate TNCs—in this case, giant tobacco multinationals. As such, it epitomizes a momentum-gathering force in global governance that scrutinizes business activities in terms of its effect on human rights, health, sustainability and the environment.

It bears repetition that FCTC, the first, binding, multilateral global public health agreement represents a significant innovation in health governance and serves as a model of how global health institutions should cultivate key links with other institutions and the civil society:

Through the FCTC, ministries of health and health-related associations, such as physician groups, are united with ministries of finance, economic planning, taxation, labour, industry, and education as well as with citizen groups and the private sector, to create a multisectoral, national and international tobacco control effort. The FCTC represents a growing trend in development policy towards an alternative paradigm that is broad, integrated, and multifaceted. (Ruger, 2004, p.1080)

Post-FCTC, TNC corporate strategy may need to reckon with the intermediation rights of global governmental organizations to secure the wellbeing of the global community, particularly its more vulnerable members. For example, already there is TAN demand for a multilateral convention under WHO auspices to rein in TNCs in the food and beverage industry to control the global obesity problem. (Wise, J, 2014) One of the key lessons in this paper is that attempting to manage such threat by deploying conventional public relations and corporate social responsibility tactics is unlikely to succeed in the face of a determined TAN with strong influence over relevant multilateral organizations. Rather, well-organized, well-informed and well-funded TANs are increasingly likely to act as watchdogs of global public interests, be at the vanguard of civil society activist communities, scrutinize TNC performance, and whenever necessary challenge them by working toward multilateral regulatory regimes.